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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

... I

WAYNE E. CARROLL and MARY W.
CARROLL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.

11

n

PHIL M. BIRDSALL and M. La VERNE
BIRDSALL, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
11854

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
;1

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action of Unlawful Detainer arising
out of a breach by the Defendants-Appellants of a

Gnifom1 Real Estate Contract by and between themselves and the Plaintiffs-Respondents.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was granted in favor of the Plaintiffs' Respondents ousting the Defendants-Appellants from
1

the subject property, and quiting title in the saia
Plaintiffs, plus awarding treble damages · The rea.
sonable rental value of the subject property was determined to be $85.00 per month.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts as related by the Defend
ants are somewhat complete, except that Plaintiffs
add thereunto certain variations to conform with the
record.
The 2D Notice which the Plaintiffs had served
upon the Defendants was the Notice to Quit as
required by Section 78-36-6 ( 1), Utah Code Anno·
tated, 1953, as amended. <Exhibit PlZ, R,7&8l.
The Notice to Quit was served upon both of the
Defendants, personally. ( R. 8) No evidence was in·
troduced to the contrary. When personal service I'
obtained the requirement of the Statute is completrd.
and no service by mail is required. Defendants r\iii
not at any time in the Lower Court object to or cun·
tradict this fact.
The Lower Court made a finding that the Notic_e
to Quit was properly served. CNo. 6,R,104') Defel]l!ants did not object to this finding. CR,70-80)
The subject contract CR,3) prov1·aec1 for monthh
the
P ayments of $100.00' per month. Subsequently
$1'0
3 Oil.
·
monthly payment was increased to that of
2

per month, by agreement of the parties. Defendants
On
11·ere consistently in default. (Exhibit P4-10)
mauy occasions they failed to make the complete
payment.
As of March 12, 1968, the date the Defendants
were served the 1st Notice, they should have paid a
total of $20,800.00, exclusive of the taxes and insurance. The Carroll records with adjustments show
that they paid the sum of $17 ,092.08, including taxes
and insurance. The Court permitted Counsel for
Plaintiffs to prepare an accounting showing interest
on a monthly basis with interest figured to the 5th
of the month, and to include the adjustments as
supported by the evidence and as Plaintiffs' claimed
them to be. In accordance with this accounting, the
Court made a finding that the balance due on the
contract was $4,106.05. (R,105)
The Defendants claimed that the contract balance was less than the mortgage balance owed by
Carroll to Doxey-Layton. The Court found that this
was not so. The records showed that the Defendants
11 erP consistently in default with their payments, and
therefore could not come before the Lower Court with
'clean hands' according to the Principle of Equity;
Yet they claimed that it was unconscionable for the
lower Court to grant judgment to the Plaintiffs.
The Lower Court determined that the real 'rmable rental value for the property was $85.00. For

3

wrongfully withholding the property from the Pl ·
.
tiffs after proper Notice to Quit was served upon
them, the Lower Court granted restitution of the
premises and awarded treble damages to the Plain·
tiffs. The Plaintiffs in accordance with the Judgment
gave Defendants Notice that they had a credit due
them of $812.41, subject to their giving up possession
and daily damages of $8.50.
The letter of April 8, 1968, was answered with a
request from the Plaintiffs that the Defendants sho11
good faith by depositing with the Comt sufficient
cash to cover any delinquency. A hearing before
the Court was held, and the Court denied the Plaintiffs request and ordered a submission of their record)
to the Defendants.
The Defendants having consistently defaulted
on their contract, the Court found that they were not
entitled to anything more than a credit of
per month, for rental of the property. This was in
accordance with the law of the State of Utah. (Per·
kins v. Spencer and Jacobson v. Swan)
The Court's Memorandum Decision was an opui
ion only and not intended as the Judgment. In fact
the Court requested the Plaintiffs file Finding of Fact
.
Conclus10ns
of Law and Judgment bef 01·e it woulo
listen to any objecti,ons. This was done prior to
'pressure' on the part of either of the lawyers. l
62,63,64)
4

The 'pressure' was exerted after the Defendants
filed their Objections to the Judgment of August 25,
1969, and up to the time the Court signed the Judgment of September 25, 1969.
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment were mailed to the Defendants on
September 23, 1969, two days prior to the day the
Court signed and entered them. ( R, 102, 106)
On September 25, 1969, after Counsel for Plaintiffs had advised the Court that it would accept the
rental value of $85 .00, per month, and so advised
Counsel for Defendants, the Court signed and entered
its Judgment granting restitution, quieting title and
awarding treble damages.
The offer of September 23, 1969, did not include
the payment of the attorney's fees. In fact the Defendants' Counsel intended to pay the amount into
comt but did not do so, and in fact admitted to Coun1el for Plaintiffs that the checks they held had not
been paid. They were in for collection.
Defendants had the time allowed them by the
rules to file Objections to the Judgment of September
2
5, 1969; however, they did not take advantage of
their opportunity. They in fact did not file any
Objections to the Judgment of September 25, 1969
The Court did not deny them this right, neither did
the Plaintiffs.

5

Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants Notice ol
Entry of Judgment by mailing same on the 26th day
of September, 1969. (R,107) On the 29th day ol
September, 1969, Defendants obtained an Order Sta.
ing the Judgment and filed an insufficient bond.
was only after the Plaintiffs filed Objections and had
a hearing before the Lower Court that the Defendant'
finally posted security ordered by the Lower Court.
<R,127,128)
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE REQUIREMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT IN REVIEW·
ING THE INSTANT CASE ON APPEAL.

In regard to the question of review of a case
from the lower or trial court by this appellate
in cases of equity, this court has the duty and obli·
gation to sustain the lower court, unless the decree or
judgment is found to be against the clear weight ol
the evidence, or is contrary to law or establishea
principles of equity, and in doubtful cases, the find·
ings of the trial court should not be disturbed.
In support of this doctrine, the Plaintiffs-Respon·
dents quote from the two cases cited by the Defend·
ants-Appellants as follows:
"
This being a suit in equity, we
J'f
· · ·
.
, dence
quired to pass upon the weight of the evi
6

In doubtful cases, the findings of the trial court
should not be disturbed, because it hears the
evidence which we but read, and it has the
opportunity of observing the witnesses, their
apparent frankness and candor or the lack
thereof, and hence is in a better position than
are we as a reviewing court to pass upon the
weight that should be given the evidence ... "
- - - - Croft v. Jemen, 40 P2D 198. (Utah)

"In actions of equitable cognizance, this court

will examine the record and weigh the evi-

dence, but the decree or judgment will be
sustained on appeal unless it is found to be
against the clear weight of the evidence or is
contrary to law or established principles of
equity." Cline v. Hullum, 43 P2D 152. (Oklahoma)

Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully submit that
in the instant case now before this Court that the
Decree or Judgment of September 25, 1969 is supported by the evidence, is not contrary to law or
established principles of equity and therefore it
should not be disturbed, and they argue herein in
support of this proposition.

7

POINT II
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING
AND CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT !Hf
DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT IN THEIR PERFORMING
ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE UNIFORM REAl
TATE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NO!
SUPPORT A FINDING OF DEFAULT ON THE PART Of!Hf
PLAINTIFFS.

Section A
The questi.on of the default of the
in regard to the payments due and owing on the con·
tract is uncontradicted. In this respect the weight of
the evidence is clearly in favor of the Plaintiffs ana
supports the Judgment of the District Court.
On July 1, 1954, Plaintiffs and Defendants, a'
Seller and Buyer, entered into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract whereby the Seller agreed to sell, and the
Buyer agreed to purchase certain real estate situate
in Salt Lake County, Utah, at an agreed purcha'e
price payable at the rate of $100.00, per month.
sequently this monthly payment was increased tn
$150.00, per month. (Exhibit P-8, P-28, R,3 & R,10!
Defendants failed to comply with the terms for
monthly payments on many occasions, and the con·
tract was consistently in default. (Exhibits P-tf-!0.
R, 184, 185)
·
y·ment hall'
The final failure to make a time1Y pa
ry j Ve·
pened on or about the 9th day of J anua '

j

1

8

when the Defendants gave Plaintiffs a check for
$150.00, which bounced. Defendants however were
finally given credit for the January 9th payment
when they subsequently gave the Plaintiffs $150.00
cash sometime in February, 1968. This incident
culminated when the Plaintiffs finally called a halt
to the entire matter on March 11, 1968, when they
issued and caused to be served the 1st Notice upon
the Defendants. Said Notice gave the Defendants
the alternative of either bringing the contract current
or returning the property to the Plaintiffs. At the
time of issuing the 1st Notice, the February and
March payments had not been paid.
To show the consistent default status of the Carroll-Birdsall contract a schedule showing a comparison between the total annual payments required and
the total annual amounts paid is as follows, to-wit:
SCHEDULE p
DATE

h.
c.
d.
e.
f.

,.r,

h.

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1%0
1961
1962
1963

A
Total Due Per
Contract & Admendment

$ 900.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,450.00
1,800.00
1,800.00
9

B

Payments Made As
Per Carroll's Records
With Adjustments

$ 300.00
951.08
1,049.02
1,308.92
1, 159.40
1,256.12
635.00
1,146.37
1,800.00
1,653.20

k.

m.

n.
o.

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

p.

Totals

1.

1,800.00
1,800.00
1,800.00
1,800.00
450.00

1,650.94
1,552.70
1,281.33
1,200.00
150.00

20,800.00

17,092.08

An analysis of the above schedule shows that the
Defendants were in default on the contract earh
year except the years: 1957, 1959, and 1962.
Plaintiffs submit that the weight of the evidence
supports the findings and conclusions of the lower
court that the Defendants were in default on their
contract.
Section B
Defendants' contention that they were not in
default for failing to make the required monthlv
payments because Plaintiffs failed to convey subject
property to them in connection with the Dow 1'·
Layton mortgage is not according to the terms of the
contract, nor equitable.
Defendants appear to be somewhat immaturein
trying to excuse their failure to comply with
·
terms of the contract by trymg
to bl ame the Plam·
.
tiffs for their faults. Defendants should recognize
uffer the
their wrongs and be mature enough to s
consequences of their own acts.
10

Plaintiffs cite the terms of the contract to which
reference should be made in regard to the default
to which the Plaintiffs refer, and the default to which
the Defendants refer, as follows:
The clause regarding conveyance to the Buyer
is as follows:
"The seller is hereby given the option to execute and maintain a loan secured by mortgage
upon said property of not to exceed$ (contract
balance) ... bearing interest at the rate of not
to exceed - 6 - per cent. When the principal
has been reduced to the amount of the loan
and mortgage, the Seller agrees to convey and
the buyer agrees to accept title to the above
described property subject to said loan and
mortgage."
The clause of the contract regarding forfeiture
and repossession is as follows:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to
make any payments when the same shall become due, or within 30 days thereafter, the
Seller shall, at his option, be released from
all obligations in law and equity to convey
said property and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the
Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the
co11tract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller
may, at his option, re-enter and take possession
of said premises . . . "
11

Also the clause of the contract regarding conveyance of title is as follows:
"The Seller on
payments hereui
reserved to be paid at the times and in the manner above mentioned agrees to execute ano
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and suf.
ficient warranty deed conveying the title tn
the above described premises free and clear
of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as . . ."
Accordingly, before the Defendants would oe
entitled to have title to the subject property conveyeu
to themselves, the contract .on their part would haw
to be current and in good standing; otherwise, the·
would have no recourse. To think or do othern1s1
would appear to the Plaintiffs to be contrary to the
terms .of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract.
and against the principles of equity and public poller
Section C
For sake of argument only and without conceea
ing that Defendants' have a point that they shoulil
have been given additi.onal credit for payments nr
amounts alleged to be overlooked, wrongly includea.
erroneously entered, or for whatever reason as ma:
be applicable, the Plaintiffs comment on the evideucP
in answer to Defendants' Brief which presents thN
items under POINT II, beginning at Page 10.
ITEM 1.

<The $25.00 amount)

JI

B. d 11 cre111
1. Carroll testified that he gave ir sa .t 11,,
for this amount, and explained that 1 ''
12

the item shown· on Exhibit 22-P, as the
entry where he had first made it as the date
of March 7th and then scratched it out and
entered it as February23.. Mr. Birdsall did
not controvert this testimony or introduce
any other evidence than the receipt to show
otherwise. (R, 179, 189)
ITEM 2.

!The $35.00 amount)

1. Carroll testified that at the time of this pay-

ment there was a question of bouncing
checks, and that during the period of this
check, he showed tw.o payments of $35.00,
each, and that this certain $35.00, was included in the payments recorded for January, 1958. (R, 180-182)

ITEMS 3 & 5.

(Taxes of $133.98 for 1960 and of $189.61
for 1965)

1. The agent from Doxey-Layton testified that
the taxes were paid by Doxey-Layton, that
Mr. Carroll made the payments on the contract, and that the payments on the contract were current. Carroll testified that
the taxes were paid through Doxey-Layton.
Mr. Birdsall testified that he could not remember about paying the taxes for 1959.
He could not remember that far back. Also,
Mr. Birdsall did not keep a record of payments made on the contract to Mr. Carroll.
Carroll testified that the taxes for these
years should have been included in his
records. <R,224; R,174, R,210; R,271)
ITEM 4.

!Bounced check for $43.251

1. This amount of $43.25, is represented by a
check which the Bank returned unpaid.
13

Birdsall never contradicted this
0
Carroll testified that it probably sho:1(1
have been charged back mto the account
He further testified that because of bouncing
he had a_ constant problem oi
chargmg back such items. (Exhibits 25.p
R, 183)
.
ITEM 6.

<Tape Recorder -

$22.17 difference)

1. Carroll testified that Birdsall obtaimcl 0
tape recorder for him at the wholesalr
price, and that he gave him credit acconl
ingly. Birdsall did not controvert thi,
testimony by denying this conversation
alleged to by Carroll. In fact there is not
testimony in the record which contradict;
Carroll's testimony that Birdsall was to re·
ceive any thing other than the wholesale
price for the tape recorder. CaJToJl,
records show what Carroll understood the
wholesale price of the tape recorder to he
(Exhibit P, 10; R, 165, 166)
ITEM 7.

<The payment of $125.001

1. Carroll testified that he received on!Y one
payment on March 13, 1967, from Birds'.'!!.
an·d that this was paid by the Bishop wlml!
Carroll thought was sent through the mail
The original receipt and the duphcatr
· to the
made by Mr. Carroll were not given
.
Birdsalls. They remained in the possesswn
of the Carrolls. until Mr. Carroll gave tl1elll
to Farr. Blauer took them from Farr'so11w
over to Rigtrup's office and
1
turned them to Farr's office. m, 1?!. '·
272,273,275,238,239, 172)
14

2. Birdsall went to the hospital on February
22, 1967, with a heart attack. He testified
of the incident as follows: CR, 277)
"February 22, 1967, I was admitted to
the hospital with a heart attack, and we
hadn't paid the payment before, and
my wife took the payment up and the
check that Bishop Metcalf gave her,
because he paid the payments on the
house while I was in the hospital. And
Mr. Carroll told me that we would
have to make up the extra, $150.00 that
was due on the three months, on account that he wouldn't accept the
$125.00, and that is exactly what we
did .... "
Exhibit P10 contradicts Birdsall's testimony. It shows that on February 23, 1967,
the day before Birdsall entered the Hospital
a payment of $75.00 had been recorded by
Carroll. For the month of January, 1967,
a payment of $150.00, had been made.
Previously to that for December, 1966, the
entry of $81.33, for the tape recorder was
made.
Mrs. Birdsall testified that she couldn't remember about the payment of March 13,
1967. CR, 219)
In addition to the above items, Defendants at one
time contended that they should be allowed credit for
Sli0.00, as a payment on July 9, 1954, and included
in the Blauer accounting. (Exhibit 32D) The court
did not allow them to have credit for this item, and

15

rightly so since the weight of the evidence support J
this conclusion. <R, 267 to 270)
eu
Plaintiffs should be allowed to include an iteni
for $16.43, of pro-rated insurance which the court
allowed and was included in the Farr accounting bu
excluded from the Blauer accounting. <Exhibit +OP.
R, 134, 135)
Carroll also reflected in his account and Blauer
excluded from his without any evidence or good rea
son, the fees and costs retained by Bayles, of $16.611:
and a 2D attorney's fee of $50.00. (Exhibit P2, p1,,
PB, 32D)
Blauer also excluded from his accounting a
bounced check which Carroll shows reflected in hi'
records just prior to his entry dated the 22nd day ol
February, 1965. Defendants did not introduce
evidence to contradict that fact that this was a corrrit
entry. The court allowed it to remain, and theweigll'
of the evidence supports the fact that it should remain
as indicated in the Carroll records. CR, 9 &

f

32D)

g

Blauer's accounting contains an err.or of $11 5.:: h
under date of January 5, 1955, which should be co'.
9
rected. Also the bounced check of J anuary ' · c
was improperly deducted under date of January ·
1967, in the Blauer accounting. (Exhibit 32D!
16

l

The weight of the evidence supports the Courts
Finding of Fact No. 11, that the contract balance as
of March 5, 1968, was $4,106.05. Also the Blauer
accounting supports this finding after adjusting his
balance of March 5, 1968, of $2,538.23, as shown on
Page 7 of his accounting. (Exhibit 32D)
The following schedule reflects these above
changes and shows that the Blauer balance would
exceed the above contract balance referred to in Finding of Fact No. 11. <R, 105)
SCHEDULE B
Date

Explanation

a. 3/12/68

Ii

1

Adjustment

Totals

Adf. Bal.

Blauer Balance __
$2,538.23
b. 7/9/54
Earnest Money .. 170.00 208.11 378.11 2,916.34
c. 11/30/54
Ins. pro-ration .... 16.43 17.90 34.33 2,950.67
d. 1/5/55
Blauer error ...... 115.72 133.70 249.42 3,200.09
e. 2/25/55
Duplicate pmt ... 25.00 28.44 53.44 3,253.53
f. 1/10/58
Duplicate pmt ... 35.00 28.40 63.40 3,316.93
g, 5/12/58
Fees & costs ........ 16.60 12.72 29.32 3,346.25
h. 11/30/60
. Taxes - 1960 ...... 133.98
71.16 205.14 3,551.39
1·

9I1I61

. Fees .................. 50.00
]. 6/20/64
Bounced check .. 43.25
17

l

Interest

23.25

73.25

3,624.64

10.61

53.86

3,678.50

k. 2/7/65
Bounced check 133.38
I. 11/30/65
Taxes - 1965 ...... 189.61
m. 12/16/66
Tape recorder .... 22.17
n. 1/9/67
Bounced check .. 150.00

26.71 160.09 3,838
26.98 216.59
1.65

23.82

10.87 160.87 4,239.ai

POINT III
THE CONCLUSION BY THE LOWER COURT THAT DEFEND
ANTS WERE IN DEFAULT, ENTITLED THE PLAINTIFFS, AIA
MATTER OF LAW, TO THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THI
LOWER COURT.

This Court has stated in the Perkins v. Spencrr
case, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2D 446, 452, what doctrine
it follows in cases such as the instant case, to-wit:
". . . This Court is committed to the doctrine.
that where the parties to a contract stipulafr
the amount of liquidated damages that
be paid in case of a breach, such stipulation!'
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the darn
ages actually sustained .... "
Furthermore, in the Perkins V. Spencer case, uii·
Court outlined a formula to guide the lower Court in
determining damages in such cases, and at Page +ii.
243 P2D, it is as follows, to-wit:
"The vendors are entitled to any loss
casioned them by any of these factors:
(1)
(2)

(3)

...

18
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I

(4) For the fair rental value .of the property during the period of 9ccupancy.
"The total of such sums should be deducted
from the total amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it would be fair to allow
recovery, and any remaining differences
awarded to the plaintiffs."

In the instant case, the Lower Court and Plaintiffs
followed the above doctrine and formula. The Lower
Court determined that the Defendants were in default, and that the reasonable rental value of the
property was Eighty Five & No/100 ($85.00) Dollars
per month CR, 101-106). The Plaintiffs followed
the formula, figured out the differences and
then informed the Defendants by written notice sent
to their attorney on the 29th day of September, 1969,
m, 111) that they, the Plaintiffs were ready
to deliver to the Defendants what ever amounts were
due and owing as a difference between the amounts
paid by the Defendants, and the rental set by the
court plus treble damages according t.o the Judgment
entered on September 25, 1969, as follows:
Total amounts paid by the Defendants $16,936.91
less:

Rental- 7 /1/1954 to 7 /1/1969
$15,385.00
Damages - 7/2/1969 to 9/25I1969
739.50

16,124.50

Amount due and tendered to Defendants $ 812.41
19

The Defendants were also advised that the saia
amount of $812.41, diminished at the rate of
per. day, until they gave up possession and quit tht
sub1ect property.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs-Respondents refer thiJ
Court to the Law of the Jacobson v. Swan case, 3litaii
2D 59, 278 P2D 294, and assert that in accordanre
with same they were and are entitled to restitution
of the subject property, and treble damages all assel
forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.
and Judgment of September 25, 1969 (Court Fili.
101-106).
Plaintiffs-Respondents submit to this Comi that
the said Judgment is in accordance with good con·
scious, in accordance with the law of the Perkinsana
Jacobson cases, in accordance with the principle oi
equity applicable to this case, and the establisheil
doctrine and formula of this Court.
POINT IV
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE LOWER cour
WAS INTENDED ONLY AS AN OPINION OF THE COUil
PRELIMINARY TO THE FILING OF THE FINDINGS OF FACTI
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT.

A review of the Record of the Lower Court shoult!
indicate to this Court that the Lower Court neier
. .
b fo:JI
intended the Memorandum Decision to e a
.
. .
1udgment
or decision
as conten d e d f or bY the Defenn
ants.

20

I

IQ

\,

e.

I
1

After the Lower Court filed its Memorandum
Decision, Plaintiffs filed Objections and Amended
Objections to said Memorandum ( R, 62-64) and sent
Defendants a Notice CR, 63) advising of a hearing
on July 29, 1969, before Judge Hanson, to consider
Plaintiffs' Objections. On the 29th of July, when
Plaintiffs counsel appeared for the hearing, Judge
Hanson advised that before he could hear any objections that Plaintiffs' counsel would have to prepare
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
Plaintiffs prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment which were signed
and entered by the Court on August 25, 1969 ( C, 6569). Then Defendants filed Objections (R, 70-80),
and the Plaintiffs filed Answers CR, 94-100) to said
Objections.
Defendants' Objections were subsequently heard
and denied. Plaintiffs prepared amended Findings
of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment <R,
101-106). Copies of same were mailed to the Defendants on September 23, 1969, two days before the court
signed and entered said Judgment on September 25,
1969 <R, 106).
Plaintiffs thereafter on September 26, 1969,
sent the Defendants a Notice of Judgment <R,
the Defendants a Notice of Judgment (Court File,
l07) advising of the Judgment, and among other
things, that the Court had determined the reasonable
rental value of the property was $85 per month.
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Based upon the difference between the reasonable rental value of $85 per month from July 1, 19i4.
to July 1, 1969, and the total amounts paid in, thP
Plaintiffs notified the Defendants that they had dut
them a credit of $812.41 and tendered the sametothe
Defendants subject, however, to 1he condition that
they would deliver up possession of the property tr!
the Plaintiffs (R, 111).
Defendants did not file any Objections to the
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
of the 25th day of September, 1969. However, thev
did file a Motion to Stay the Execution of said Judg·
ment, which the Court granted. It was from the
Judgment of September 25, 1969, that the Defendant1
appealed (R, 113).
The Defendants did not appeal from the Memorandum Decision which was entered July 2,
(R, 61).
The Defendants did not Object to the Memo·
randum Decision until or in conjunction with their
Objections to the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment of August 25, 1969, a period of 51
days.
The Court File and Transcript of Record appear
to confirm the fact that the Defendants and the Plain
tiffs considered the Memorandum Decision to be
nothing more than an informa 1 statemen t by the
Olurt.
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In WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 27, at Page
45 and 49, the word Memorandum is defined as

follows:
A 'memorandum' in common parlance is an
informal record. Patterson v. Beard, 288 NW
414, 416; 227 IOWA 401; 125 ALR 393.
A memorandum merely stating the conclusions of a judge on an issue before him, and
giving direction as to an order, judgment, or
decree which may be entered, is an opinion,
whether labeled 'memorandum' or 'conclusion'
or 'opinion'; and from an opinion no appeal
lies. In Re Beam, 117 A. 613, 93 N. J. Eq. 593.
The case cited by Defendant, Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2D 74, 415 P2D 662, is not in point with
the case before this Court. The Drury case dealt with
the question of the basic rights bestowed upon a person by an Order granting a New Trial.
This Appellate Court has previous said in the
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, case,
133 P2D 919, 922, in regard to a final judgment that:
It must appear that that 'which is offered as
the record of a judgment is really such and not
an order for a judgment or a mere memorandum (emphasis added) from which the
judgment was to be drawn.
Also in the Clegg case this Court has in effect said
that a Judgment to be final must be supported by
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Memo.
randum Decision of the Lower Court was intendea
to be only a memorandum in the sense that it Wai
an informal record of the court's conclusions or opinions and did not bind the Court nor preclude it frorn
entering its Judgment of September 25, 1969.
POINT V
THE AWARD OF TREBLE DAMAGES BY THE LOWER COU!l
WAS PROPER IN THAT IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE lAW
AND THE EVIDENCE AND NOT CONTRARY TO THf
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY.

Section 78-36-6 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated 19j31
as amended, provides that the Notice to Quit may be
served:
By delivering a copy to the tenant personally
Plaintiffs' Notice to Quit (Exhibit P-12, with
Return of Notice attached) was personally semd
upon the Defendants on the 25th day of March, 1968.
Deputy Sheriff, L. W. McAllister, certified that he
personally served Phil M. Birdsall and M. La Veine
Birdsall on said date in Salt Lake County, Utah. The
record shows this fact. The Defendants did not intro
duce any evidence to the contrary. The Lower Courl
made a Finding to the effect that such Notice to Qwl
was properly served (R, 104).
Plaintiffs Notice to Quit was admitted in
01
dence without any objection and with the consent
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Defendants' attorney, Kenneth Rigtrup. Neither did
Defendants make any objection to said Notice to Quit
either at the trial or at anytime thereafter in the
Lower Court CR, 23 & R, 70-80). There is no
evidence to contradict its sufficiency.
This Court should not be confused by the Defendants attempt to invalidate the Plaintiffs' 1st notice,
the Notice advising of the default (Notice to Pay or
Quit) which was served upon the Defendants prior
to the service of the Notice to Quit.
Plaintiffs submit that the Perkins case as cited by
Defendants is not authority to support their claim that
Plaintiffs' 1st Notice is invalid.
Plaintiffs submit that the Perkins case is authority to support their claim that the Lower Court
properly awarded treble damage.
The Perkins case sets forth the doctrine which
this Court has followed in unlawful detainer actions.
It outlines a formula to help determine damages
which might be suffered by one entitled to repossession of property wrongfully detained. (See Plaintiffs'
discussion of the Perkins case in POINT III)

In the instant case the 2D Notice: the Notice to
was served upon the Defendants in accordance
with Section 78-36-6 ( 1). After receipt of the 2D
N.
otJce they remained in possession. They neither

25

brought the contract current nor gave up possession.
The Court found that they were in default, and that
the reasonable rental value was Eighty Five &
No/100 ($85.00) Dollars per month. The weightoi
the evidence supports this finding CR, 159, 160, 161..
187, 200, 201, 203, 217, 218)
'
"?nder these circumstances the laws of Utah
sustam an award for treble damages and restitution
of the property. (See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah
468, 243 P2D 446 and Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2D
59, 278 P2D 294)

I

Plaintiffs submit that in accordance with Section I
78-36-1 O, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sa amended:
the cases herein cited and the weight of the evideme
the lower court properly entered Judgment in their
favor.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion Plaintiffs submit to this court that
the lower court properly weighed the evidence, aml
in so doing arrived at a judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. In reaching iG
decision the lower court had the benefit of listening
'
to and observing
the witnesses as they testified under
oath on the stand, of watching their demenor,_renct
ing to their reactions and personality,
to
1
their speach inflections, etc. A court setting whJCh '
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impossible to reflect in the record or transfer up to
this court.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs submit to this court that:
1. The lower court did not allow a forfeiture.

2. That the Judgment of the lower court was
rendered in good conscience. It would not
shock the conscience of one who had
breached the terms of his contract.
3. That the Defendant have received all that
to which they are entitled in accordance
with the terms of their Uniform Real Estate
Contract, and with the established principles of equity, and law.
4. That after many many consistent defaults
the Plaintiffs acting in good faith declared
a default and requested repossession of the
subject property.
5. That it would be against established principles of equity and public policy in addition
to being contrary to the terms of the contract for this court to require the Plaintiffs
to convey subject property in accordance
with Defendants contention that the Plaintiffs should have done so in connection with
the Doxey-Layton mortgage.
6. That the Judgment of September 25, 1969,
should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted
LIONEL M. FARR
914 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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